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NOTE
THE BOEING/MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
MERGER REVIEW: A SERIOUS STRETCH
OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION POWERS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, just before the long-awaited Merger Regulation1
promulgated by the then-titled European Economic Community
was to take effect, a leading scholar on European competition
law, Barry Hawk, predicted that the European Commission's
(EC) "broad remedial powers under the Regulation may raise
jurisdictional and comity issues if the EC attempts to invoke
them in transactions involving non-Community firms."2 Today,
this prediction has become a stark reality, most recently evi-
denced by the heated controversy surrounding the EC's review
of the merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, two
U.S. aircraft manufacturing giants.
The EC, as part of a remedial condition of its approval of
the merger under the Merger Regulation, insisted that Boeing
relinquish "exclusive supply" contracts that the manufacturer
had sealed with three U.S. airline companies.3 The contracts
were unrelated to the merger, and U.S. critics, including mem-
bers of Congress, accused the EC of imposing a settlement
remedy that exceeded the boundaries of its antitrust authority
1. Council Regulation 4064189, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, corrected version in 1990
O.J. (L 257) 13 [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
2. Barry E. Hawk, The EEC Merger Regulation: The First Step Toward One-
Stop Merger Control, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 210 (1990).
3. See Commission of the European Communities, The Commission Clears the
Merger Between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Under Certain Conditions and
Obligations, RAPID Press Release, July 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Li-
brary, ECNews File [hereinafter Commission Press Release]. At the time of this
publication, the official decision was not reported, but was slated to be reported in
1997 O.J. (L 336) 16.
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under the Merger Regulation.4 These critics claimed the EC
was not analyzing the impact of the merger on competition,
but merely was acting to protect Boeing's European rival man-
ufacturer, Airbus Industries.5 Relations between the U.S. and
the European Union (EU) quickly became strained, despite
years of work toward cooperation between the antitrust au-
thorities of the two world powers.6
The Boeing case sparked much posturing in both the Unit-
ed States and the EU with politicians, lawyers and antitrust
officials on both sides exchanging threats and accusations.7
But now that the dispute has ended, with Boeing caving in to
the EC's demands, the "jurisdictional and comity issues" allud-
ed to by Hawk in 1990 and raised in the Boeing case in 1997
are unresolved. In particular, the boundaries of European
remedial powers under the Merger Regulation are at least
unclear-and at most, they are potentially limitless if the Boe-
ing case stands as an unofficial precedent allowing the EC to
structure remedies wholly unrelated to a merger and targeted
at transactions without effects or implementation within the
EU. As Hawk noted, the EC's remedial powers are broad. Yet
they should not be so broad as to give the EU jurisdiction over
private agreements between foreign businesses that are unre-
lated to a merger under review. This stretch of power, which
occurred in the Boeing case, is contrary to principles of comity
and will make it difficult for businesses to predict which of its
transactions have the potential to run afoul of European merg-
er control.
This Note provides a legal analysis of the Merger Regula-
4. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions
opposing the European Commission's "interference" in a U.S. business transaction.
H.R. Res. 191, 105th Cong. (1997), 143 CONG. REc. 5550 (1997); S. Res. 108,
105th Cong. (1997), 143 CONG. REC. 7609 (1997); see also Brian Coleman, Air
Freight: Threat of Trade War Over Boeing Reflects Antitrust Limitations: Clinton
Hints at Retaliation, As U.S. - EU Cooperation on Probe Breaks Down, WALL ST.
J. EUR., July 18, 1997, at Al.
5. See, e.g., S. Res. 108., supra note 4.
6. For example, in 1991, the U.S. and the European Commission signed a
treaty outlining principles of cooperation in international antitrust investigations.
See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their
Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-Eur. Comm., 30 I.L.M. 1491 [hereinafter
1991 Agreement].
7. See discussion infra Part IL
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tion that will show how the EC exceeded its remedial powers
in its application of that regulatory framework to the Boeing
case. This Note argues that the exclusive supply contracts
between Boeing and the three U.S. airlines were beyond the
reach of EC review under the Regulation, and thus should not
have been part of any settlement agreement between Boeing
and the EC. Furthermore, this Note suggests that the EC also
could not secure jurisdiction over Boeing's contracts using its
two other main bases for antitrust review, Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty of Rome.'
Some would argue that the EC's questionable grab ofjuris-
diction over Boeing's contracts demonstrates the need for an
international antitrust authority, most likely under the auspic-
es of the World Trade Organization, that would provide less
biased and less politicized reviews of mergers and other inter-
national transactions with antitrust implications.' This view-
point recognizes that private restraints on trade, such as cer-
tain types of exclusivity agreements between private parties,
increasingly are replacing government barriers as major im-
pediments to free trade, thereby linking antitrust issues to
trade issues in the global market." In the Boeing case, for
example, an international antitrust authority might have har-
monized U.S. and EU laws as they applied to the merger and
might have adjudicated the dispute between the two powers.
But rather than revisit proposals for internationalization of
antitrust law, this Note will suggest less ambitious solutions
that might have been utilized in the Boeing case. For example,
a conciliation mechanism, similar to one recommended in 1995
8. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
arts. 85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
9. For a summary of different views about the internationalization of anti-
trust, see Spencer Weber Waller, National Laws and International Markets:
Strategies of Cooperation and Harmonization in the Enforcement of Competition
Law, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1111, 1124-25 (1996); see also Diane P. Wood, The In-
ternationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV.
1289, 1295 (1995); see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws
and the New Protectionism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.J.
INTIL L. & COM. REG. 393, 436 (1994) (stating that "[a]n International Antitrust
Authority should be created under the auspices of the GATT to foster harmoniza-
tion of national antitrust laws that affect trade, to resolve disputes, and to pro-
mote cooperation on issues relating to antitrust process and enforcement.").
10. See Waller, supra note 9, at 1124-25; see also Wood, supra note 9, at
1291.
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by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD)," could provide a strong framework for conflict
resolution that might have allowed Boeing and U.S. officials to
prevent the EC from manipulating its Merger Regulation to
serve vague political or corporate interests. As Professor
Spencer Weber Waller wrote in 1996: "The present system
provides numerous possibilities for opportunistic behavior that
benefits different countries and their nationals in particular
disputes." 2 This Note concludes that unless or until an inter-
national antitrust regime is established, any mechanism de-
signed to reduce such "opportunistic behavior" would be a
welcome addition to the mix of national antitrust laws and
cooperation agreements that now govern competition on the
world market.
Part II of this Note provides a background of the conflict
between the United States and the EC in the Boe-
ing/McDonnell Douglas merger. This section includes a look at
the EC's concerns about the exclusive contracts between Boe-
ing and the three airline buyers. Part III provides a brief out-
line of the Merger Regulation, with emphasis on Article 8(2),
the provision used to declare the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
merger "compatible" with the European Community after Boe-
ing agreed to give up its exclusivity clauses in its contracts
with the airlines. This section shows how the settlement im-
posed in the Boeing merger fell beyond the scope of the Regu-
lation. Part IV suggests that the exclusive contracts were also
beyond the jurisdictional reach of the EC under Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty of Rome because they were not implemented
in the EU and did not have appreciable effects in the Union.
Part V traces the use of international comity considerations in
the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, and contem-
plates the use of an enhanced U.S.-EU co-operation treaty,
with more specific provisions for conflict resolution, as a basis
for a renewed injection of comity into antitrust analysis. Part
VI suggests ways the United States and the EU can incorpo-
rate a conflict resolution mechanism into their antitrust coop-
11. OECD REVISED RECOMIMENDATION CONCERNING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN
MEMBER COUNTRIES ON ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, OECD Doc. No. C(95) 130 (Final) (July 27 & 28, 1995) [hereinafter OECD
Recommendations].
12. Waller, supra note 9, at 1124.
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eration agreement with an aim of curtailing the manipulation
of each regime's competition laws.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE
On July 1, 1997, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) announced its approval of the merger of Boeing Corpora-
tion and McDonnell Douglas Corporation." The union of the
two aircraft manufacturers reduced the number of competitors
building large commercial jet airliners to just two-Boeing and
Airbus Industries. Still, the FTC found that the commercial
aircraft manufacturing division of McDonnell Douglas, called
Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC), was no longer an effective
player in the market. 4 While declining to declare DAC a fail-
ing firm, the FTC found that its buyout by Boeing would have
little impact on competition, and in any event, no companies
other than Boeing wanted to buy DAC."5 Applying U.S. anti-
trust laws to these circumstances, the FTC held that the merg-
er would not substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in either defense or commercial aircraft mar-
kets. 6
Upon FTC approval, Boeing expected to slide easily into
its position of world dominance," in which it would have
more than 70% of the market for large airliners. 8 But in-
stead, Boeing found itself in last minute negotiations with a
different and foreign antitrust authority. The EC, invoking
jurisdiction under EU competition laws, 9 refused to approve
the merger without certain concessions from Boeing. U.S. offi-
cials intervened to try to persuade the EC to approve the
13. See Statement of Chairman Robert Pitosky and Commissioners Janet D.
Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek III and Christine A Varney in the Matter of Boeing Com-
pany/McDonnell Douglas Corporation, File No. 971-0051 (visited Oct. 8, 1997)
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/9709/boeingsta.htm> [hereinafter FTC Statement].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. A critique of the FTC's finding and its application of U.S. antitrust
laws to the merger is beyond the scope of this article.
17. See Brian Coleman, Jeff Cole & Robert S. Greenberger, Crash Landing:
Boeing's Ordeal In EU Was Mostly Of Its Own Making, WALL ST. J. EUR., July
28, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Crash Landing].
18. See Boeing v. Airbus: Peace in Our Time, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1997, at 59,
61. The EC also places Boeing's post-merger market share for large commercial jet
aircraft at 70%. See Commission Press Release, supra note 3.
19. See Merger Regulation, art. 21.
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merger on terms favorable to Boeing. ° But the EC, which
under its Merger Regulation can impose a fine of 10% of a
company's worldwide turnover for a violation of the regula-
tion,21 would not back down.
Congress, led by legislators from Boeing's home state of
Washington, quickly responded. In its July 23, 1997, resolution
chastising the EC's actions, the U.S. House of Representatives
said the EC was "apparently determined to disapprove the
merger to gain an unfair competitive advantage for Airbus
Industries, a government-owned aircraft manufacturer; and...
this dispute could threaten to disrupt the overall relationship
between the EU and the United States which had a two-way
trade in goods and services of approximately $366 [billion] in
1996."' Furthermore, resolutions passed in both the House
and Senate vowed that any disapproval by the EC of the Boe-
ing/McDonnell Douglas merger "would constitute an unwar-
ranted and unprecedented interference in a United States
business transaction that would threaten thousands of Ameri-
can aerospace jobs."' In addition, reports circled that the
Clinton administration threatened to challenge government
subsidies to Airbus Industries before the WTO or to impose
taxes or penalties on Airbus-manufactured planes sold in the
United States.'
The FTC was in turn accused of trying to protect a "na-
tional champion" by approving the merger. 5 The EC engaged
in its own campaign to stop the merger as it was originally
planned. Karel Van Miert, the European Competition Commis-
sioner, openly complained about parts of the merger during a
visit to the United States in early 1997.26 Meanwhile, Van
20. See Crash Landing, supra note 17.
21. See Merger Regulation, art. 14(2). Turnover is defined as "products sold
and services provided to undertakings or consumers in the Community." Id. art.
5(1).
22. H.R. Res. 191, supra note 4.
23. Id.; see also S. Res. 108, supra note 4.
24. Vago Murdian, White House Eyes Options in Advance of EU's Merger Re-
jection, 196 DEF. DAILY, July 16, 1997, at 11, available in LEXIS, Market Library,
Iacnws File. Vice President Al Gore stated that the United States would act quick-
ly if a U.S. company were put at an "unfair competitive disadvantage because of
an improperly motivated regulatory decision of a foreign country." See Stanley
Holmes & Michele Matassa Flores, Boeing-Deal Tussle About Trade, SEATTLE
TiMES, May 15, 1997, at D1.
25. Boeing v. Airbus: Peace in Our Time, supra note 18, at 59.
26. See Emma Tucker, Editorial, Van Miert's Finest Hour, FIN. TIMES, July
598 [Vol. XXIV:2
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Miert insisted that the EC was not out to protect Airbus. 7
A. Boeing's Concessions to Gain EC Approval of the Merger
After much wrangling among the EC, the United States,
and Boeing, the aircraft maker acceded to European demands
and agreed to a list of obligations and conditions that would
satisfy the EC and gain its approval of the merger. Boeing
agreed to:
1) Refrain from entering exclusive supply contracts until
2007, and not enforce the exclusivity rights in its existing
contracts with three U.S. airlines."
2) License to competitors non-exclusive patents developed
from publicly financed research and development.2 9
3) Maintain DAC, the commercial aircraft manufacturing
unit of McDonnell Douglas, as a separate legal entity for a
period of ten years. 0
4) Refrain from using its dominant position to abuse relation-
ships with customers and suppliers.3 1
Part one of the settlement, requiring Boeing to give up its
exclusivity contracts, was the most unpalatable to Boeing. It
stirred the most controversy, and is the focus of this article.
24, 1997, at 11. One anonymous EC official told the newspaper: "This case has
politicised the Merger Regulation which is the one bit of competition policy that
should be kept in an iron cask sealed off from the politicians. It has undone a lot
of the efforts that have been made over the last few years to give credibility to
the Commission's handling of mergers, even if the result is not too bad." Id.
27. Id.
28. See Commission Press Release, supra note 3.
29. Id. This part of the Boeing/EC settlement reflects the EU's concern about
U.S. subsidies to the aircraft industry. The EU's concern is that the monetary and
research and development benefits secured in contracts to manufacture defense
aircraft can spill over to benefit the civil aircraft manufacturing side. The U.S.
and EU have long been fighting over such indirect and direct subsidies that are
given to aircraft manufacturers and signed a treaty on the issue in 1992. See dis-
cussion infra Part I.JA
30. Id.
31. Id.
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B. The EC's Objections to Exclusive Supply Contracts
Throughout its review of Boeing's proposed takeover of
McDonnell Douglas, members of the EC repeatedly voiced
concern about exclusive supply contracts that Boeing had en-
tered into with three U.S. airlines.32 The first contract of this
type, hailed as a bellwether for the aviation industry,33 was
struck between Boeing and American Airlines in November
1996. Under the contract, American agreed to purchase jet
aircraft solely from Boeing for the next twenty years in ex-
change for greater flexibility in exercising purchasing options.
Delta Airlines cinched a similar deal with Boeing in March
1997, and Continental followed in June.34 Together, the three
airlines account for less than 11% of all demand for commer-
cial jet aircraft. 5
In its review of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, the
EC found that the conclusion of these exclusive supply con-
tracts unlawfully reinforced Boeing's dominant position in the
worldwide market for large commercial jet aircraft.36 The EC
used the Merger Regulation to force Boeing into settlement
talks that ultimately resulted in the relinquishment of the
contracts.
Few antitrust experts would argue that the EC lacked
jurisdiction to review the merger under its Merger Regula-
tion.37 But because the exclusivity contracts were wholly un-
related to the merger, critics questioned the EC's motives in
32. See Airbus Industrie, EU Object to Boeing's Exclusive Deal with Continen-
tal, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, June 16, 1997, vol. 12, no. 24, available in LEXIS, Mar-
ket Library, Iacnws File.
33. See Bruce A. Smith et al., Business Deals Evolve as Market Grows, AVIA-
TION WKL & SPACE TECH., Mar. 17, 1997, at 56, vol. 146, no. 11, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, Avweek File.
34. See Airbus Wins Aircraft Contracts, Rebounds from Boeing's Sole Source
Deals, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, June 23, 1997, vol. 12, no. 25 available in LEXIS,
Market Library, Iacnws File. Boeing maintained that the airlines requested the
contracts. See Michael L. Weiner et al., Interview with Thomas L. Boeder And
Benjamin S. Sharp, Attorneys for Boeing, 12 ANTITRUST 5, 7 (1997) [hereinafter
Boeing Interview]. Industry analysts confirmed that the deals were favorable to
the airlines. See Karen Walker, Delta Deal Fires Debate; Decision Calls for 20-year
Alliance with Boeing Co., 13 AIRLINE BUS., May 1997, at 14, available in LEXIS,
Market Library, Rbi File.
35. See Boeing v. Airbus: Peace in Our Time, supra note 18, at 61; see also
FTC Statement, supra note 13, at 3.
36. See Commission Press Release, supra note 3.
37. See discussion infra Part III.
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challenging them in the context of a merger review.8 A brief
account of the history of competition between U.S. and Europe-
an civil aviation industries makes any pledge of objectivity on
either side difficult to swallow. It also indicates why Airbus,
and the EC, may have been eager to pry away Boeing's exclu-
sive contracts.
In the 1960s, after Boeing introduced the jumbo jet, Euro-
pean governments banded together to form Airbus, which is a
four-nation consortium made up of France's Aerospatieale,
Germany's Daimler-Benz Aerospace, British Aerospace and
CASA of Spain.39 By the 1980s, Airbus began making a strong
showing in the market for wide-body jets. The Reagan admin-
istration, acting on complaints from Boeing, began calling for a
U.S.-Europe agreement to control subsidies to aircraft manu-
facturers. 0 This effort culminated in a 1992 treaty,41 which
limited certain kinds of subsidies. However, with that issue
seemingly laid to rest, a battle heated up between Boeing and
Airbus over which firm would make the market's preferred
jumbo jet.
According to recent reports, Airbus is now developing a
600-seat super-jumbo jet to rival the Boeing 747.42 But econo-
mies in airline manufacturing are such that the cost of the
Airbus super-jumbos would rise if the consortium could not
take early orders for future purchases of the jumbo jets.43 The
exclusive contracts between Boeing and the U.S. airlines had
the potential to hinder Airbus' efforts to get future orders for
jumbo jets, and thus, raise its costs for sales everywhere. This
in turn would make the project less lucrative."
With the convergence of these financial and political inter-
ests, a pure application of the Merger Regulation, which pro-
38. See Boeing Interview, supra note 34, at 7-8.
39. See Boeing v. Airbus: Peace in Our Time, supra note 18, at 59-60. At that
time, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed made up the U.S. aircraft manu-
facturing industry. Lockheed dropped out of civilian aircraft manufacturing in
1981. Id. at 59.
40. Id. at 60.
41. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the European Community Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement on
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, State Dept. No. 92-199, 1992 WL 466106 (entered
into force July 17, 1992).
42. See Boeing v. Airbus: Peace in Our Time, supra note 18, at 61.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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vides a foundation for settlement agreements, was overlooked.
The limits of European remedial powers were lost in the clash
of interests.
III. THE EU MERGER REGULATION
The EC can review any merger that meets its jurisdiction-
al requirements under the EU Merger Regulation.45 The key
factor is whether the merged entity would do enough business
worldwide and in the EU to trigger EU jurisdiction under the
Merger Regulation. The Regulation applies to "all concentra-
tions with a Community dimension."8 A "concentration" in-
cludes a merger of two independent undertakings, or certain
joint ventures.47 At the time of the Boeing acquisition of
McDonnell Douglas, a concentration had a "Community dimen-
sion" where the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all
undertakings involved was more than 5 billion ECU48 and the
45. The Merger Regulation was adopted on December 21, 1989, and became
effective on September 21, 1990. Prior to this enactment, the EC attempted to
review mergers under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. See generally,
Alec Burnside & Carl Meyntjens, The EEC Merger Regulation and Its Impact on
Non-EEC Businesses, 1990 BYU L. REv. 1373 (1990). For an additional history of
EU merger control and a summary of the EC's process in applying the Merger
Regulation, see SIR LEON BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL IN
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 23-56 (1991).
46. Merger Regulation, art. 1.
47. Id. art. 3; see also Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating
EC Competition Law, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 55, 73 (1992).
48. An ECU is a value equaling a weighted combination of the values of the
currencies of all members of the European Union. See Waller, supra note 47, at
59 n.24. Since the Boeing case, the EC has amended the Merger Regulation to
lower the ECU threshold allowing it to obtain jurisdiction over a proposed concen-
tration. Under the amendment, a concentration has a community dimension when:
the combined aggregate world-wide turnover of all undertakings involved is more
than 2,500 million ECU; in each of at least three Member States the combined
aggregate turnover of all undertakings is more than 100 million ECU or for two
undertakings is more than 25 million ECU; and the aggregate Community-wide
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings is more than 100 million
ECU. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Regula-
tion (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings,
1997 O.J. (L 180) 9.07.
The Merger Regulation has provisions governing notifications, investigations
and other procedures applicable in the EC's review of a concentration. When the
Commission is notified of a merger or joint venture, its has 30 days to determine
whether the concentration falls under the Merger Regulation, and if so, whether to
initiate proceedings on the grounds that the concentration raises serious questions
about its compatibility with the common market. When the Commission finds a
concentration raises serious questions, as it did in the Boeing case, it will open
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aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of
the undertakings concerned is more than 250 million ECU.49
Because EU jurisdiction is based on volume of sales both
worldwide and in the Community, the Merger Regulation can
apply to non-EU companies, even if they have no assets or
property in the European Community."
If a concentration is found to have a community dimen-
sion, the EC will determine if it is compatible with the com-
mon market.5 ' In making this determination, the EC must
consider: the need to maintain and develop effective competi-
tion within the common market; the structure of the markets
concerned, the actual or potential competition; the market
position of the parties entering the concentration and their
economic and financial power; alternatives available to suppli-
ers and users; the interests of consumers, and the development
of technical and economic progress, provided that the develop-
ment is advantageous to consumers and does not form an ob-
stacle to competition.52
After considering these factors, the EC decides if the con-
centration would create or strengthen a dominant position, and
as a result, significantly impede effective competition." Any
concentration found to create or strengthen a dominant posi-
tion and significantly impede competition in the Community or
a substantial part of it will be declared incompatible with the
common market under Article 8 of the Merger Regulation.'
If the EC finds that a concentration is incompatible with
the common market, it may block the proposed union of the
parties55 or order them to separate if they have already
formal proceedings that must be completed within four months. See Merger Regu-
lation, arts. 6, 8, 10.
49. See Merger Regulation, art. 1.
50. See Waller, supra note 47, at 74; see also James S. Venit, European Merg-
er Control: The First Twelve Months, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 981, 981-82 (1992).
51. Merger Regulation, art. 2.
52. Id. art. 2(1)(a),(b); see also Waller, supra note 47, at 74.
53. Merger Regulation, art. 2(3).
54. Id. arts. 2(3), 8(3).
55. The first proposed merger blocked by the Commission was a joint acquisi-
tion of the de Havilland division of Boeing of Canada and Boeing Canada Technol-
ogy by Aerospatiale, a French company, and Alenia, an Italian company. See
Areospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 1991 O.J. (L 332) 42. For a discussion of that
case, see Jason A. Garick, International Horizontal Mergers: A Comparison of Eu-
ropean Union and United States Regulatory Policy and Procedure, 7 TRANSNATL
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merged or entered into a joint venture." If the parties pro-
ceed anyway, the EC has the power to impose fines of up to
10% of the aggregate worldwide turnover of the merging par-
ties."
Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation prescribes the EC's
power to declare a problem concentration "compatible" after
modifications are made by the parties. The modifications must
be such that the concentration will no longer create or
strengthen a dominant position that would significantly im-
pede competition in the common market.58 Firms seeking to
merge or enter into a joint venture have considerable incentive
to modify their arrangements and get the EC's stamp of ap-
proval under Article 8(2). This is because the EC's alternative
is to block the concentration or impose substantial fines on the
firms." The EC "can block a transaction without seeking judi-
cial enforcement, a fact that greatly strengthens its hand in
settlement negotiations." ° While few concentrations are
blocked, many transactions are modified in response to EU
competition concerns.
LAW. 293, 301-22 (1994); see also Venit, supra note 50, at 983.
56. Merger Regulation, art. 8(4).
57. Id. art. 14(2).
58. Id. arts. 8(2), 2(2). The text of article 8(2) is:
Where the Commission finds that, following modification by the under-
takings concerned if necessary, a notified concentration fulfills the criteri-
on laid down in Article 2(2), it shall issue a decision declaring the con-
centration compatible with the common market.
It may attach to its decision conditions and obligations intended to en-
sure that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they
have entered into vis-a-vis the Commission with a view to modifying the
original concentration plan. The decision declaring the concentration com-
patible shall also cover restrictions directly relating and necessary to the
implementation of the concentration.
59. See Helmut Bergmann, Settlements in EC Merger Control Proceedings: A
Summary of EC Enforcement Practice and a Comparison with the United States,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 51 (1993). Parties may appeal a decision to block a con-
centration before the European Court of Justice. But the parties must wait until
the appellate process is concluded before proceeding with a merger or joint ven-
ture. Therefore, an appeal is not always a practical or attractive course of action
for a firm, and [iun fact, the parties are more likely to abandon a transaction if
the EC renders a blocking decision. Id. at 50.
60. Id. at 50.
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A. Application of the Merger Regulation to the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger
Boeing notified the EC of its intent to merge with
McDonnell Douglas on February 18, 1997.61 The EC exercised
jurisdiction because the merger met the definition of a concen-
tration with a Community dimension.62 Within the initial one-
month review, the EC found that the merger raised serious
questions about its compatibility with the common market.
The EC then opened formal proceedings.
After a more complete investigation, the EC found that
"the proposed merger leads to a significant strengthening of
Boeing's already existing dominant position in the worldwide
market for large commercial jet aircraft."63 Because Boeing's
dominant position was to be strengthened, the merger would
have been incompatible with the common market under Article
2(3). Rather than face the possibility of heavy fines, Boeing
negotiated with the EC and agreed to make changes. The EC,
acting under its Article 8(2) powers, eventually declared the
merger compatible subject to these conditions and obliga-
tions."
Among these conditions and obligations were Boeing's
promises to license to competitors non-exclusive patents devel-
oped from publicly financed research and development and to
maintain McDonnell Douglas' commercial aircraft manufactur-
ing division as a separate legal entity for ten years.65 Conces-
sions such as these typically constitute part or all of EC reme-
61. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Begins An In-
depth Investigation Of The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger, RAPID Press Re-
lease, Mar. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File.
62. Worldwide and Community-wide ECUs for Boeing/McDonnell Douglas were
not published. But together, the manufacturers have two-thirds of the EU large
commercial jet aircraft market, according to the Commission. See Commission
Press Release, supra note 3.
63. Id. The Commission stated that:
strengthening arises from MDC's own competitive potential in large com-
mercial jet aircraft, from the enhanced opportunity for Boeing to enter
into long-term exclusive supply deals with airlines (already exemplified by
those with American, Continental and Delta) and from' the acquisition of
MDC's defense and space activities, which latter confer advantages in the
commercial aircraft sector through spillover effects in the form of R&D
benefits and technology transfer.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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dial settlements. However, relinquishment of exclusive supply
contracts unrelated to a merger is not typical of an Article 8(2)
settlement.66
B. Settlements Under the Merger Regulation; The Conditions
and Obligations Provision
Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation is the "legal basis for
[ECI settlement procedure" 7 and is used by the EC to engage
firms in settlement talks designed to make proposed concentra-
tions "compatible" with the European common market. Article
8(2) says the EC "may attach to its decision [declaring a con-
centration compatible] conditions and obligations intended to
ensure that the undertakings concerned comply with the com-
mitments they have entered into vis-a-vis the EC with a view
to modifying the original concentration plan." 8 The text of
Article 8(2) says nothing about what types of modifications,
and more specifically, what types of conditions and obligations
designed to achieve those modifications, are acceptable terms
of a remedial settlement.
Formulating an appropriate remedy is not always easy. In
an interview conducted shortly after the EC's Boeing decision,
Alexander Schaub, the EC Director General for Competition,
pointed out the difficulties in fashioning remedies designed to
make concentrations compatible with the common market.
Schaub said:
The concerns expressed by the EC in Boeing were firmly
based on the doctrine developed in the process of applying
the Merger Control Regulation. According to this doctrine, a
dominant firm shall not be allowed to strengthen its competi-
tive potential by acquiring a competitor. It is as clear as that.
Another question is looking for a suitable remedy to your
basic competition concerns and applying that remedy in a
proportionate manner. In certain situations doctrinally pure
remedies are not easy to find, let alone to apply without do-
66. See generally Bergmann, supra note 59. Typical remedies include requiring
partial divestitures of certain assets, requiring the merging parties to license tech-
nology to third-party competitors or otherwise benefit them so that they may con-
tinue to compete, or to create future obligations for the parties that seek to avoid
anti-competitive results of the merger. Id. at 47.
67. Id. at 51.
68. Merger Regulation, art. 8(2).
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ing more harm than good to the parties and to consumers or
to the general public.69
Certainly, innovative remedies are important in light of
the absence of specific remedial directions in Article 8(2), the
difficulties in tailoring remedies that are responsive to numer-
ous interests and the obstacles to information-gathering that
sometimes accompany review of foreign mergers.7° Nonethe-
less, remedies imposed, whether inside or outside the context
of a settlement, must have some limitations grounded in com-
petition law and doctrine. If they do not, firms undergoing a
merger review would, like Boeing, find that some prior agree-
ments or transactions-unrelated to the merger-present an
obstacle to gaining approval of the merger. Likewise, with no
limits on the remedies that they can enforce, European compe-
tition authorities could use Merger Regulation settlements to
undo transactions or eliminate practices of the merging parties
that they find unfavorable to the interests of Europe's own
competitors, even when those transactions or practices were in
place long before the merger review began and had little anti-
trust implications. 1 In such a climate, businesses would have
difficulty knowing when and how they might run afoul of Euro-
pean competition law. Thus, particularly for the benefit of
businesses, the EC must negotiate settlements with elements
anchored in the Merger Regulation.
A closer look at Article 8(2) demonstrates that the provi-
sion provides that anchor; it limits the types of transactions
that may be reviewed under that section, and thus included in
any remedial settlement.
1. The Ancillary Restrictions Provision
The text of Article 8(2) states that "ft]he decision declaring
the concentration compatible shall also cover restrictions di-
69. See Interview with Alexander Schaub, Director General for Competition, EC
Commission, 12 ANTITRUST 13, 14 (1997).
70. See generally Michael Weiner, Remedies in International Transactions: A
Case for Flexibility, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 261, 276 (1996).
71. Boeing entered its first exclusive supply contract with American Airlines
in November 1996. It announced its intent to merge with McDonnell Douglas in
December 1996. An attorney for Boeing claims the first contract pre-dated even
any discussions of the merger. Boeing Interview, supra note 34, at 7.
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rectly relating and necessary to the implementation of the
concentration."72 These restrictions, called ancillary restric-
tions, are usually agreements between merging parties that
include non-competition clauses, exclusive supply agreements
or other restraints established to facilitate a merger.73 Nor-
mally, this type of restraint is reviewable only under Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome,74 but for efficiency's sake,
Article 8(2) allows the EC to review and possibly alter or elimi-
nate such restrictions in the context of a merger review.7" The
EC applies the ancillary restrictions provisions using guide-
lines issued in 1990.76
On its face, the ancillary restriction provision seems of
minor importance, but in fact, "the guidelines on the types of
transactions covered and on ancillary restraints are crucially
important in that they will effectively define the relative
scopes of application of the Regulation, existing EEC competi-
tion rules, and national laws with respect to joint ventures and
ancillary provisions." 7' According to the guidelines, any agree-
ments that are unrelated to the merger are not subject to the
EC's review under the Merger Regulation.78 Only agreements
that meet the definition of ancillary restriction can be reviewed
under the Merger Regulation. The guidelines state:
For restrictions to be considered "directly related" they must
be ancillary to the implementation of the concentration, that
is to say subordinate in importance to the main object of the
concentration. They cannot be substantial restrictions wholly
different in nature from those which result from the concen-
tration itself... The notion of directly related restrictions
likewise excludes from the application of the Regulation addi-
72. Merger Regulation, art. 8(2).
73. See Hawk, supra note 2, at 210-11.
74. Id.
75. See Commission Notice Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentration,
1990 O.J. (C 203) 5 (1990) [hereinafter Commission Notice]. The Commission No-
tice, which is a guideline for application of the ancillary restrictions provision of
Article 8(2), states that covering these restrictions under the merger review avoids
parallel Commission pkoceedings, one concerned with the assessment of the concen-
tration under the Regulation, and the other aimed at the application of Articles 85
and 86 to the restrictions which are ancillary to the concentration. Id.
76. See id. The Commission issues such guidelines for the application of nu-
merous regulations.
77. See Hawk, supra note 2, at 195 n.3.
78. Commission Notice, supra note 75.
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tional restrictions agreed at the same time which have no
direct link with the concentration. It is not enough that the
additional restrictions exist in the same context as the con-
centration .... Restrictions must likewise be "necessary to
the implementation of the concentration," which means that
in their absence the concentration could not be implemented
or could only be implemented under more uncertain condi-
tions, at substantially higher cost, over an appreciably longer
period or with considerably less probability of success.79
Furthermore, the guidelines state that "the restrictions
meant are those agreed on between the parties to the concen-
tration which limit their own freedom of action in the mar-
ket."" The EC applies these guidelines to determine whether
certain agreements are ancillary to a concentration, and thus
subject to conditions and obligations during a merger review.
As for exclusive purchase or supply agreements, the notice
on ancillary restrictions describes the type of exclusive pur-
chase and supply agreements that are common to mergers or
joint ventures and most often meet the definition of ancillary.
These agreements occur when the sale of part of a company
disrupts supply or purchase lines within the company. To en-
sure that the acquired portion continues to receive products or
have an outlet for its products necessary to its business, the
acquiring firm may enter into an exclusive supply or purchase
agreement with the company that remains after the sale. This
agreement can last until the acquired portion is able to estab-
lish other outlets or lines of supply. The EC will tolerate these
normally anti-competitive arrangements in only clearly neces-
sary instances.8
2. Applying the Ancillary Restriction Guidelines to Boeing's
Exclusive Supply Contracts
Boeing's exclusive supply contracts with three U.S. airlines
did not meet the definition of ancillary restriction under the
EC's own guidelines, and therefore were beyond the scope of
review and alteration under the Merger Regulation. The con-
tracts were wholly different in nature from any agreements de-
79. Id. art. II(4)(5).
80. Id. art. H1(3).
81. See id. part III(C).
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signed to effectuate the concentration between Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas. It is possible the contracts were entered
into during the same general time that Boeing was formulating
its acquisition of McDonnell Douglas, but the guidelines state
that timing is not enough to subject restrictions to review un-
der the Regulation in the absence of a "direct link" with the
merger.82 Likewise, the exclusive supply contracts were not
"necessary to the implementation" of the concentration. Boeing
could have acquired McDonnell Douglas even in the absence of
the exclusive supply contracts with the airlines. In addition,
the absence of these contracts would have had no impact on
the cost, implementation or success of the merger transaction
itself.
In any event, the agreements were not between Boeing
and McDonnell Douglas, the "parties to the concentration," but
were restrictions between Boeing and third parties. In a merg-
er review, the EC may look at restrictions on third parties that
are the "inevitable consequence of the concentration itself'
under Article 2 of the Merger Regulation,83 which allows an
assessment of the concentration's impact on the market, on
consumers and on supply and demand trends. But if these
restrictive "effects" on third parties are not the result of the
merger itself, they are not reviewable under the Merger Regu-
lation. Rather, if "restrictive effects on third parties are separa-
ble from the concentration they may, if appropriate, be the
subject of an assessment of compatibility with Articles 85 and
86 of the EEC Treaty." '
C. Using the Ancillary Restrictions Provision to Limit the
Scope of Settlements
The ancillary restriction provision provides a simple and
effective limit on the types of conditions and obligations that
can be required by the EC in a merger review. In summary,
the EC may not review or require alterations to any agree-
ments that are unrelated to the merger. Had the EC consid-
ered its own guidelines in the Boeing case, it should have con-
cluded that it could not force Boeing to give up the exclusive
82. See id. art. 11(4).
83. Id. art. 11(3).
84. Id.
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supply contracts in the context of a merger review. Rather, it
should have looked for remedies having a direct relation to the
problem concentration.
IV. EC COMPETITION POWERS UNDER ARTICLES 85 AND 86
While lacking jurisdiction over Boeing's exclusive supply
contracts under the Merger Regulation, the EC might have
tried to attack them under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome." These articles provide a well established basis for
review of horizontal and vertical restraints that potentially
restrict competition.86 Boeing's exclusive supply contracts
would be considered a vertical restraint because the agree-
ments flowed from the manufacturer down to its purchaser.
This type of agreement is analogous to "exclusive purchase
agreements" that are of great concern to the EC and that usu-
ally require a reseller to purchase certain goods solely from one
manufacturer. 7 The EC sees some vertical restraints as an
impediment to the integration of the European market, and,
along with ensuring effective competition, integration remains
a major goal of European competition law. The EC also has
recognized that vertical restraints may not only hinder integra-
tion and trade among member states, but also may interfere
with trade between the EU and other nations.
Just as vertical restraints can either promote or hinder the
creation of a real single market, they can be either beneficial
or detrimental to international trade. The Union's policy in
this area is therefore of wider international importance.89
Articles 85 and 86 are the primary tools used by the EC to
effectuate its competition law policies favoring market integra-
tion and liberal international trade.
85. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 85-86.
86. Vertical restraints are agreements between producers of goods and buyers
of goods; typically they are between producers and wholesale or retail distributors.
See Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, COM(96)721
(final) at 1-2 [hereinafter Green Paper]. Horizontal restraints are agreements be-
tween businesses on the same tier, such as those resulting in cartels and other
price-fixing schemes.
87. See generally Green Paper, supra note 86.
88. Id. at i.
89. Id.
611
BROOK. J. INTL L.
A. Article 85
Article 85 prohibits agreements "which may affect trade
between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market.... .9 o The types of agreements
prohibited include those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any
other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical develop-
ment or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a compet-
itive disadvantage; and
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by
the other parties of supplementary obligations, which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no con-
nection with the subject of such contracts."
Under Article 85(2), any agreement found to be in viola-
tion of Article 85(1) is "automatically void."92 The definition of
prohibited agreements under Article 85 is broad, and has been
used aggressively to punish illegal cartels." With respect to
other potentially violative agreements, the EC relies on a noti-
fication system in which firms inform the EC about their
transactions.94 Article 85(3) allows the EC to grant individual
exemptions from Article 85(1) for certain agreements or con-
certed practices that may restrict competition, but that also
contribute "to improving the production or distribution of goods
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
90. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85(1).
91. Id.
92. Id. art. 85(2).
93. See Waller, supra note 47, at 58-60.
94. Id. at 61.
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consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit."95 The EC also
has issued regulations creating exemptions for entire catego-
ries of agreements. These "block exemptions" do not require
notification.96
B. Article 86
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits "[a]ny abuse by
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it" insofar as that
abuse "may affect trade between Member States."97 The abuse
includes, blut is not limited to, conduct:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling
prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical developments to
the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a compet-
itive disadvantage; and
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance
by the other parties of supplementary obligations, which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no con-
nection with the subject of such contracts. 9
Article 86 does not prohibit firms from obtaining a domi-
nant position, which can range from 45 percent to 60 percent
of market share, but rather allows the EC to strictly police the
behavior of firms in a dominant position.9 Prohibited practic-
es by dominant firms often include predatory pricing, refusals
to deal and tying.' In addition, the EC can consider the ex-
istence of these practices as evidence of a dominant posi-
95. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85(3).
96. See Waller, supra note 47, at 63-66.
97. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 86.
98. Id.
99. See Waller, supra note 47, at 68-69.
100. See id. at 70-71.
613
BROOK. J. INTL L.
tion.'0 ' While Article 85 is more often applied to vertical re-
straints, Article 86 can also be used to prohibit those agree-
ments when they involve dominant firms.0 2
C. Extraterritorial Application of Articles 85 and 86
For many years, the EC from time to time exercised anti-
trust jurisdiction over foreign transactions that had an "effect"
in the European Community, thereby using a doctrine very
similar to that employed in the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws and developed in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America.'0 ' Continued use of the effects test was
thrown into doubt in 1988 when the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) '"formulated a new doctrine for determining whether
European competition laws should apply to non-EU firms. In
the famous Wood Pulp case,' the ECJ affirmed a decision in
which the EC asserted jurisdiction over non-EU producers of
wood pulp who conspired to fix prices for EU customers, but
the Court did not base its opinion on the effects doctrine, as
the EC had. Rather, the Court held that the EU competition
laws applied to the wood pulp cartel because the price-fixing
scheme was implemented in the European Community.06
Since Wood Pulp, the EC has attempted to utilize the imple-
mentation doctrine adopted by the Court, but in practice, the
results of this approach are often similar to results under the
effects test as used in the United States. 07
101. See id. at 69.
102. See generally Green Paper, supra note 86; see also Case 322/81, Michelin
v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 282 (1985).
103. See Waller, supra note 47, at 59-60; see also United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
104. Private parties or member states may appeal EC competition law decisions
to the ECJ. See Louis HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
AlS 1423-25 (2d ed., 1987).
105. Case 9/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhito Oy v. Commission (Wood Pulp), 1988
E.C.R. 5193.
106. Id.
107. See Waller, supra note 47, at 60. For a discussion of problems arising
from the EC's use of the effects approach and ECJ's use of the implementation
approach, see Allison J. Himelfarb, Comment, The International Language of Con-
vergence: Reviving Antitrust Dialogue Between the United States and the European
Union with a Uniform Understanding of Extraterritoriality, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 909 (1996).
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D. EC Jurisdiction Over Boeing's Contracts Under the
Implementation or Effects Tests
The EC would have been unlikely to gain jurisdiction over
Boeing's exclusive supply contracts by using either the imple-
mentation approach or the effects test. First, the contracts
were between Boeing and U.S. airlines and were not imple-
mented or in any way carried out in the EU. Thus, the EC's
exercise of jurisdiction over the contracts would be in direct
conflict with Wood Pulp.
The effects test might provide stronger grounds for assert-
ing jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the EC would have quite a task
to show, as required under this doctrine, that the foreclosure of
less than 11 percent of the U.S. market for new large commer-
cial jet aircraft sales had an appreciable effect in the EU. This
foreclosure would be felt in the EU if it forced Airbus to raise
prices or allowed Boeing to raise prices enough to hurt airline
purchasers in the EU. But reports indicate that Airbus, a com-
pany with sales around $9 billion and profits of about $1 bil-
lion per year,"' is too strong to be gravely affected by
Boeing's three exclusive supply contracts.
In the absence of an implementation or effects in the EU,
the EC should not apply Articles 85 and 86 to transactions
involving non-EU firms. Thus, even if Boeing's exclusive sup-
ply contracts constituted the type of agreements that are sub-
ject to scrutiny under these articles, the EC would have failed
to meet the threshold for extraterritorial application of the
articles and would not have been able to require Boeing to give
up the contracts.
108. See Boeing v. Airbus: Peace in Our Time, supra note 18, at 59-60. Boeing
attorney Thomas Boeder said: "Airbus, incidentally, has similar arrangements [ex-
clusive supply contracts], we believe; one, for example, with U.S. Airways. Because
of the way Airbus does business, it is much more difficult to get at any informa-
tion to confirm that." Boeing Interview, supra note 34, at 9. The Boeing attorneys
described the benefits to the airlines in the exclusive arrangements. See id. If
these contracts are indeed beneficial to airlines, as reports said (see Walker, supra
note 34), then perhaps they allow the airlines to keep prices low, rather than
forcing them to raise prices for passengers.
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V. COMITY PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
As the Boeing case illustrates, global enforcement of one
sovereign's antitrust laws has the potential to spark major
disputes between trading partners and could result in the
disruption of good relations and even the imposition of trade
sanctions by one or both partners. The chances are great that
such a dispute will arise in the future, given the increasing
number of international mergers and transactions and the
growing link between trade and antitrust issues. Unfortunate-
ly, this progression in international antitrust relations comes
at a time when courts deciding antitrust suits have severely
limited the use of comity principles in cases involving extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction.
A. The Declining Consideration of Comity in the United
States and the EU
The principle of comity has been defined as a "rule of cour-
tesy.""0 9 Comity is not a legally binding limitation, but "more
like an act of altruistic deference or an acknowledgement of
superior foreign interests... in the matter at hand."n ° The
extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws, as Hawk indicat-
ed, can give rise to comity issues,"' especially when an anti-
trust authority seeks to apply its laws to a transaction already
reviewed by the antitrust authority in the home state. For
example, in the Boeing case, the FTC approved the merger
before the EC completed its review." Under comity princi-
109. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 86 (4th ed. 1996).
110. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 738 (2d
ed. 1995).
111. See Hawk, supra note 2, at 210.
112. See FTC Statement, supra note 13. In their decision approving the merg-
er, the FTC commissioners briefly commented on Boeing's 20-year exclusive supply
contracts. They said the contracts were potentially troubling, but they declined to
act on them. Instead, the commissioners stated the agency intends to monitor the
potential anticompetitive effects of these, and any future, long term exclusive con-
tracts. Id. at 3. Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga dissented in so far as the deci-
sion approved the merger of the manufacturers' commercial aircraft units. She also
stated:
I also agree with my colleagues that no action is warranted concerning
the twenty-year exclusive arrangements for commercial aircraft that Boe-
ing recently reached with three major U.S. airlines. The arrangements
account for an estimated 11% of the market, well below any level that
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ples, the EC would have been obliged to give some deference to
the opinion of the FTC, its rationale for approving the merger,
and the overall interests of the United States in seeing the
merger go forward.
Although comity principles can serve to minimize conflicts
in international relations, their use in the United States has
been declining and, as some scholars suggest, has never been
strong in the EU."3 In the United States, the 1993 Supreme
Court decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California"4
substantially abridged the broad use of comity principles ap-
plied by some lower courts. In Hartford, the Supreme Court
considered whether the Sherman Act prohibited certain con-
duct by British corporations operating under British insurance
market regulations."' The Court rejected the defendants' ar-
guments that the U.S court should consider international comi-
ty (i.e., the British interest in allowing the conduct under its
regulatory scheme) and thereby should decline to exercise
jurisdiction over certain claims stemming from conduct not
prohibited by British law."6 The Court eschewed use of the
criteria that many lower courts had used to determine whether
international comity militated against an exercise of jurisdic-
tion."7 Instead, the Court held that international comity only
should be of concern under the laws enforced by the Commission. Given
the state of the law and the fact that the exclusive arrangements appar-
ently are unrelated to the proposed transaction, what is curious is that
my colleagues choose to mention them at all.
Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga in The Boeing Company, File No.
971-0051 (visited Oct. 8, 1997) <http://www.ft.gov/opa/9709/boeingsta.htm>.
113. See, e.g., Joseph P. Griffin, EC and U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and
Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 353, 357-58 (1994).
114. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The principal lower court case incorporating comity principles into an
antitrust analysis was Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976). Timberlane adopted a rule of reason which the court said dictated
a balancing of factors in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction including.
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of
the parties and the locations or principal places of businesses or corporations, the
extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance,
the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect Ameri-
can commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.
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precludes a court from exercising jurisdiction over foreign ac-
tors when there is a "true conflict" between laws of the
foreigners' state and U.S. domestic laws:"1 that is, where the
foreign law specifically requires the company to do something
prohibited by U.S. law. Since the British law did not require
the conduct in question (but merely permitted it), the Court
held that an exercise of jurisdiction did not violate internation-
al comity principles. The Hartford case is seen to strengthen
U.S. antitrust authorities' hand in enforcing antitrust laws
extraterritorially."5
More pertinent to the Boeing case is the question of when
the EC considers international comity in its extension of juris-
diction to non-EU firms. As discussed above, the ECJ formulat-
ed its most recent test for the extraterritorial application of EU
competition laws in Wood Pulp.20 Also in that case, the ECJ
declined to consider international comity arguments, or even to
give a reason why comity did not preclude the exercise of EU
jurisdiction over the non-EU producers. 2' This disregard of
comity principles is consistent with previous cases in which the
ECJ rejected requests for consideration of foreign interests in
light of international comity.'22 As for the use of international
comity principles by the EC, commentator Joseph P. Griffin
notes, "It appears the EC believes that international comity is
a matter of prosecutorial discretion ... and not a legal prereq-
uisite to the exercise of jurisdiction.""
The limited use of comity in the United States and EU
means that both governments will continue to aggressively
apply their antitrust laws to foreign companies. Commentator
Id. at 614.
118. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 798.
119. See Carole Aciman, Reengineering the International Corporation: Applica-
tion of U.S. Antitrust Law to Non-U.S. Conduct Affecting Foreign Markets, Con-
sumers or Producers, 10 INT'L L. PRAC. 5, 6-7 (1997). The FTC and the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) (which enforce U.S. antitrust laws) call for consideration of
international comity principles in DOJ guidelines. See 1995 Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. But Aciman
notes that "the Guidelines are unclear on where the DOJ and the FTC will draw
lines about whether to pursue enforcement actions." Id. at 6.
120. Case 9/85, 1988 E.C.R. 5193.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Case 60/81, IBM v. Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 2639, 3 C.M.L.R.
635 (1981); see also Griffin, supra note 113, at 357.
123. Id. at 358 (citation omitted).
618 [Vol. XKIV:2
19981 MCDONNELL/DOUGLAS MERGER REVIEW
Roger Alford writes, "The narrow definition of a conflict of laws
adduced in Wood Pulp and Hartford Fire ensures that comity
will almost never be a factor in the extraterritorial application
of antitrust laws; in the vast majority of antitrust cases, the
conflict is between one state encouraging or permitting certain
behavior and another state prohibiting that same behav-
ior."24 It follows that the narrow definition of international
comity would provide one explanation for the EC's exercise of
jurisdiction over Boeing's exclusive supply contracts; since the
United States laws did not require Boeing to enter the con-
tracts but merely permitted them, there was no "conflict of
laws" and thus no reason to employ a comity analysis. 25 But
this explanation fails to consider another source that arguably
requires use of a broader definition of comity in antitrust ac-
tions involving U.S. and EU parties-the 1991 treaty between
the U.S. and EU governing cooperation in competition law
enforcement.'26 As Alford states:
[T]he narrow definition of international comity is in tension
with the U.S.-EU competition laws Co-operation Agreement.
On the one hand, both the Supreme Court and the European
Court of Justice have disavowed any notion of comity save in
instances of foreign sovereign compulsion; on the other hand,
the EC and the Justice Department have adopted, with great
ceremony, the Co-operation Agreement, with its explicit in-
corporation of a comity analysis when either party's enforce-
ment activities adversely affect the other party's sovereign
interests."7
B. The 1991 Co-operation Agreement
The 1991 agreement contains a positive comity provision,
which allows the U.S. or the EU to ask the other party to take
enforcement action against a domestic business engaged in
practices having anticompetitive effect in territory of the party
124. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: A Post-
script on Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INTL L. 213, 227 (1993).
125. Of course, this is not to say that such an explanation might alone suffice
for the exercise of EC jurisdiction given the lack of authority to do so under the
Merger Regulation and Articles 85 and 86 as shown in this article.
126. 1991 Agreement, supra note 6.
127. Alford, supra note 124, at 228.
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making the request." In addition, Article VI of the treaty
instructs each party to apply a more traditional comity analy-
sis.129 Under the heading Avoidance of Conflicts over Enforce-
ment Activities, the article states: "[wlithin the framework of
its own laws and to the extent compatible with its importance
interests, each Party will seek, at all stages in its enforcement
activities, to take into account the important interests of the
other Party."130 An important interest would normally be re-
flected in antecedent laws, decisions or statements of policy by
its competent authorities.' The agreement recognizes that
as a general matter the potential for adverse impact on one
Party's important interests arising from enforcement activity
by the other Party is less at the investigative stage and greater
at the stage at which conduct is prohibited or penalized, or at
which other forms of remedial orders are imposed. 32 The
treaty also sets out factors to be considered by a Party whose
enforcement activities are adversely affecting the other Party's
important interests.3 '
The U.S. and EU use the cooperation provisions of the
treaty to consult on antitrust matters. The treaty has been
effective in promoting cooperation in cases where the U.S. and
EU have similar concerns. For example, in 1996 the DOJ and
the EC had frequent contact during the parties' investigation
of anticompetitive practices by A.C. Nielsen Co. The DOJ even-
tually closed its investigation and allowed the EC to negotiate
and put an end to the practices.34 In another case, the DOJ
and the EC coordinated a settlement agreement with Microsoft
in an attempt to end the company's exclusionary practices.
In the future, the U.S. and EU will have more opportuni-
ties to cooperate in antitrust investigations and settlement
negotiations. The provisions of the 1991 agreement provide a
strong foundation for cooperation, but so far, they have only
128. 1991 Agreement, supra note 6, at art. V(2). The party asked to take en-
forcement action is not obligated to take that action. Id. art. V(3),(4); see also
James F. Rill, A Framework for Cooperation: The Status of International Antitrust
Enforcement, 18 WHIrTIER L. REV. 321, 322 (1997).
129. 1991 Agreement, supra note 6, at art. VI.
130. Id. art. VI.
131. Id. art. VI(1).
132. Id. art. VI(2).
133. Id. art. VI(3).
134. See Rill, supra note 128, at 324-25.
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been useful in situations where both parties have similar inter-
ests in the cessation of certain anticompetitive practices. The
real question is whether the treaty leads to cooperation and
conflict solving in cases where the U.S. and EU are at odds.
The Boeing case presented an opportunity for this type of test
of the treaty's "avoidance of conflict" provisions, but there is no
evidence that either side considered Article VI or sought to
apply the factors for consideration listed in the clause. If the
treaty is to be an effective tool for cooperation in the future,
the parties must recognize that the treaty not only governs
amiable international antitrust reviews, but provides a frame-
work for cooperation in the face of conflict as well.
VI. A FORUM FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Absent from the framework for cooperation set out in the
1991 Agreement is a provision creating a conflict resolution
mechanism. Such a mechanism would be useful in cases like
Boeing because one party could assert that the other is illegal-
ly extending its jurisdiction and that claim could be mediated
or adjudicated before a neutral party. The mechanism also
could be used when the parties disagree about the type of
remedy that should be imposed on an entity under review,
even after one party has considered the other party's important
interests under the 1991 agreement.
The OECD has been instrumental in developing principles
for cooperation to be used by antitrust authorities of its
members.'35 In 1986, the OECD issued recommendations for
international antitrust cooperation that became a foundation
for the U.S.-EU agreement. 35 In 1995, it revised those rec-
ommendations to include expanded provisions for notification
and exchange of information and also to suggest a conciliation
mechanism for settling disputes between Member States."7
135. See generally Wood, supra note 9, at 1294-95. OECD members are: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
136. Revised Recommendations of the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation Be-
tween Member Countries in Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International
Trade, OECD Doc. No. C(86) 44 (Final) (May 21, 1986) reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1629
(1986).
137. See OECD Recommendations, supra note 11.
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These recommendations prod OECD members to consult with
other member states whose antitrust investigations may affect
their important interests.3 ' The parties are to try to work
out a satisfactory agreement concerning the particular enforce-
ment activity,"9 but "[i]n the event that no satisfactory con-
clusion can be reached, the Member countries concerned, if
they so agree, should consider having recourse to the good
offices of the [OECD] Competition Law and Policy Committee
with a view to conciliation."
40
This provision recommends a completely voluntary ap-
proach to conciliation, but if the OECD were to agree, member
states could incorporate a requirement for conciliation into
their antitrust agreements. The U.S. and EU should amend
their 1991 cooperation agreement to include a clause requiring
the parties to bring any irreconcilable disputes before an arbi-
trator at the OECD. Because the OECD has been "a primary
force in the international antitrust arena," "' it is most likely
equipped to mediate or arbitrate such disputes. In the absence
of an international antitrust regime, this solution could help
stem the number of conflicts resulting in threats of or actual
trade sanctions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, EU antitrust
authorities imposed a remedial settlement that exceeded the
limits of its Merger Regulation and exceeded the limits of ex-
traterritorial application of its Article 85 and 86 competition
powers. These actions also were contrary to comity principles
that should be a factor in international antitrust reviews. If
the EC, and other antitrust authorities including those in the
United States, continue to use their competition powers in
such an arbitrary manner, businesses will be forced to operate
under an unstable and uncertain area of law and the possi-
138. Id. art. I(B).
139. Id. "Each member country, without prejudice to the continuation of its
action under its competition law and to its full freedom of ultimate decision ...
should give full and sympathetic consideration to the views expressed by the re-
questing country, and in particular to any suggestions as to alternative means
fulfilling the needs or objectives of the competition investigation or proceeding." Id.
art. I(B)(4)(b).
140. Id. art. I(B)(8).
141. Rill, supra note 128, at 328.
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bility of trade sanctions between nations will be heightened. To
avoid these detrimental results, antitrust authorities must
apply their competition laws to the letter and must exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction with caution and with consider-
ation of comity. In addition, a conflict resolution forum should
serve to help resolve these disputes. Nations should be willing
to submit their disputes to such a forum so that they may
avoid the pitfalls of extraterritorial application of antitrust
laws.
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